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The Impact of Pretrial Publicity and Need for Cognition
on Mock-Jurors’ Decisions and Deliberation Behavior
Christine L. Ruva
Department of Psychology, University of South Florida Sarasota-Manatee, Sarasota, United States

Abstract This experiment explored whether negative pretrial publicity (N-PTP) and need for cognition (NC) affect
mock-jurors’ decisions and deliberation behaviors (N = 169). Jurors and juries exposed to N-PTP were significantly more
likely to render guilty verdicts than non-exposed jurors/juries. There was a significant PTP x NC interaction on
post-deliberation individual verdicts. High-NC jurors exposed to N-PTP were less likely to vote guilty than their low-NC
counterparts, suggesting a corrective function of NC on PTP bias. Hierarchical analyses revealed a significant PTP x NC
interaction for juror deliberation behavior. For N-PTP jurors, those high in NC talked more and were rated higher on
assertiveness, leadership, influence on verdicts, and presenting logical and strong arguments than those low in NC. For
non-exposed jurors NC status did not significantly affect any of the deliberation behaviors coded. This research suggests that
how and whether NC influences juror verdicts and deliberation behavior depends on case-related variables present.

Keywords Pretrial bias, Jury decision making, Jury deliberation effects, Need for cognition, Content analysis

1. Introduction
During a criminal trial, jurors process information and
evidence from both the defense and the prosecution in order
to make the crucial and difficult decision regarding a
person’s guilt. Juror/jury research suggests that how jurors
interpret, or use information presented during trial, can be
affected by information presented before trial and by
individual difference variables. For example, research has
shown that exposure to negative pretrial publicity (N-PTP;
anti-defendant) can bias jurors’ interpretations of trial
evidence, as well as how much weight this evidence is given
[1, 2]. Research has also shown that exposure to N-PTP
increases the likelihood of a guilty verdict [see 3 for review].
In addition, Need for Cognition (NC) has been deemed an
important variable, within the elaboration likelihood model
(ELM), for explaining how and when people are persuaded
[4-7]. NC has been shown to affect jurors’ judgments [8] and
deliberation behavior [9], and moderates the effect of
important case variables (e.g., case strength, evidence quality,
and inadmissible evidence) on juror decisions [10-12]. While
the prevalence of PTP in high profile cases increases the
likelihood that prospective jurors will be exposed to PTP,
jurors’ NC status may influence PTP’s impact on verdicts
and affect deliberation behavior. Using a paradigm similar
to Shestowsky and Horowitz [9], our research examines
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whether NC interacts with PTP to influence jurors’ decisions
and deliberation behavior, thus having a moderating effect
on them.
1.1. Elaboration Likelihood and Need for Cognition
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) [7] is based on
the idea that “people are motivated to hold correct attitudes,
but have neither the resources to process vigilantly every
persuasive argument nor the luxury, or inclination, to ignore
them all” [13, p. 1032]. According to ELM, persuasive
communications have their effects through two routes:
central and peripheral. The central route of persuasion entails
considerable cognitive effort, which involves accessing,
scrutinizing, and integrating all useful information in order
to make judgments [5, 7]. The peripheral route consists of a
lack of effortful processing and motivation, in which simple
cues (e.g., attractiveness of the source or the number of
arguments presented) have more influence on judgments
than relevant judgment information [6, 14, 7].
Whether people engage in central/systematic processing is
influenced by their motivation and ability to do so [5, 7],
absence of either is likely to result in peripheral or heuristic
processing [15]. People’s motivation to engage in effortful
processing has been shown to be influenced by both
dispositional (NC) [16] and situational variables (personal
relevance, personal responsibility, and group size) [17; 18;
see 15 for review]. Cacioppo and Petty [16] proposed that
NC (people’s tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful
cognitive activities) was a stable individual difference,
which subsequent research supports [see 15 for review).
Research suggests that people high in NC rely more heavily
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on issue-relevant information (e.g., trial evidence) and are
more likely to process information via the central route [13];
whereas people low in NC tend to focus on the peripheral
cues such as the attractiveness of the attorneys, the
popularity of the defendant, or the opinions or others [15].
Past research has also shown that persons high in NC tend to
rely on stronger and more relevant arguments, than weaker
ones. Whereas, individuals low in NC typically do not
differentiate between strong and weak arguments unless
given incentive to do so [19; see 15 for review].
Although people high in NC have a greater tendency to
engage in effortful cognitive processing than those low in
NC, “the extant literature confirms that this relationship can
be moderated by factors such as situational influences on
cognitive motivation (e.g., personal relevance of an event or
external contingencies surrounding a task)” [15, p. 244].
For example, Cacioppo et al.’s [15] review found neither
high- nor low-NC individuals were likely to use heuristic
processing when a topic was high in personal relevance.
However, when a topic was low in personal relevance
individuals low in NC were more likely to utilize heuristics,
such as number of arguments or source credibility, to process
and evaluate the information. This is interesting and has
implications for juror/jury decision making. Specifically, it
suggests that individuals’ motivation to engage in effortful
cognitive processing can be influenced by NC and situational
variables (e.g., importance of decision and individual
responsibility), which could result in important differences
in jurors’ decisions and deliberation behavior. The primary
goals of the present study were to examine: (1) the effect of
NC on juror decisions and deliberation behavior, (2) whether
NC moderated the effect of PTP on juror decisions, and (3)
whether the effect of NC on juror deliberation behavior
varied as a function of PTP exposure.
1.2. Need for Cognition and Juror Decisions:
Intrapersonal Aspects
Most of the research exploring the effect of NC on jurors’
decisions has involved nondeliberating jurors and
intrapersonal cognition or persuasion. Therefore, how these
individual differences affect group decisions (interpersonal
aspects of NC) has not been well studied [20]. That being
said, there is a significant amount of research at the juror
level, which suggest that while NC rarely has a main effect
on juror verdicts or guilt ratings it appears to moderate the
effect of important case related variables (e.g., evidence
strength, case strength, and use of inadmissible evidence) on
juror decisions [8, 11, 12]. Thus as Bornstein [8] suggests,
NC may serve as a moderator when interpreting and
processing complex information, such as scientific evidence
or expert testimony. Next we explore how NC might
moderate the effect of PTP on juror decisions (intrapersonal
persuasion).
The present study is concerned with how the more
elaborate processing of high-NC jurors would affect the
verdicts of N-PTP exposed and non-exposed jurors.
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Specifically, would high-NC jurors be more likely to
disregard PTP or attempt to correct for PTP bias, making
them less likely to vote guilty than similarly exposed
low-NC jurors? Consistent with past research, we expected
NC to moderate the effect of PTP on verdicts. This NC x PTP
interaction was expected based on two previous research
findings. The first, indicating that high NCs have greater
ability and motivation than low NCs to correct for obvious
bias (see 21 for review). The second showing that case
strength can moderate the effect of NC on decisions [10].
Wegener et al.’s [21] review of the literature suggests that
if the threat of bias is obvious, high NCs are more likely than
low NCs to exert the cognitive effort necessary to overcome
potential bias [also see 13 for review). Sommers and Kassin
[12] found evidence of bias correction for high-NC jurors,
but not for low-NC jurors. Specifically, evidence (wiretap)
admissibility (admissible vs. inadmissible) significantly
affected the verdicts of high-NC jurors, but not low-NC
jurors. This bias correction was selective in that high NCs
disregarded inadmissible evidence that was unreliable
(weak), but used this same information when it violated due
process and was deemed reliable.
Also relevant to the current study, case strength has been
found to moderate the effect of NC on verdicts. Leippe et al.
[10] found that high-NC jurors were less likely to vote guilty,
than low-NC (study 2) and moderate-NC (studies 1 and 2)
jurors, when the case was moderately strong. They attributed
this finding to the greater scrutiny of the trial evidence by
high NCs. Thus, making high NCs more likely to consider
evidence for the weaker side (defense), resulting in a greater
likelihood of finding a basis for reasonable doubt in such
cases. In contrast, when the case was moderately weak,
moderate-NC jurors were more likely to render guilty
verdicts than their high- and low-NC counterparts; while the
verdicts of high- and low-NC jurors did not significantly
differ.
Taken together the research and theory described above
suggests that high-NC jurors who are exposed to N-PTP may
be less likely to vote guilty than similarly exposed low-NC
jurors. This is due to high-NCs’ increased motivation and
ability to correct for PTP bias and propensity to scrutinize
evidence from both sides (defense and prosecution) of the
case. That being said, correction is only likely to occur if
high NCs deem the N-PTP to be unreliable and are aware of
its biasing effects. Research suggests that people are often
unaware of the effect of biasing factors on their decisions and
that their attempts at correction are often not wholly
successful [22-25]. We now turn to the research on
interpersonal persuasion aspects of NC, focusing on
individuals interacting in group settings (jurors interacting
on juries).
1.3. Need for Cognition and Juror Deliberation Behavior:
Interpersonal Aspects
The research reviewed above suggests that NC may
moderate the effect of PTP on juror verdicts. The question
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we now turn to is how might NC status influence juror
deliberation behavior? The NC processing links would
suggest that because of their increased motivation to engage
in effortful cognitive processing, high-NC jurors should be
more cognitively active during the deliberation process.
Previous research on NC and group settings has found that
high NC individuals are more likely than low NCs to
generate convincing arguments [26], enter discussions
earlier [27], seek advice on task related issues [28], and
speak longer in dyads and small groups [9, Study 1]. Petty
and Cacioppo [7] suggested that differences between high
and low NCs during collaborative tasks are attributable to a
reduction in motivation due to a decrease in personal
responsibility.
Specifically,
group
collaboration
(deliberation) could result in social loafing by the jurors low
in NC [29, 30] Smith et al. [30] found that while high and
low NCs performed similarly on a cognitive perceptual task
when completing it on their own, their performance differed
when completing the task in a collaborative environment;
with high NCs outperforming low NCs.
Shestowsky and colleagues [9, 31] examined the
deliberation behavior of mock jurors who were high and low
in NC by having them deliberate in groups of either two or
four (consisting of equal numbers of high and low NC jurors)
after reading a summary of a civil trial. They found that
high-NC jurors demonstrated greater involvement in the
deliberation process by talking significantly longer than
low-NC. High-NC jurors were also rated as more persuasive,
assertive, and made more significant contributions to the
deliberations than low-NC jurors. Surprisingly, high-NC
jurors were less prone to change their decisions based on
valid arguments during deliberations than were low-NC
jurors.
So how might PTP exposure, which should result in high
levels of proscribed information (PTP) and verdict
consensus, moderate the NC processing links to influence
juror deliberation behavior in a criminal trial? The level of
consensus as to the “correct” decision could affect personal
responsibility and therefore motivation to participate in
deliberations. When group consensus is low (ambiguous trial
without PTP exposure) and the decision is deemed important
(high in personal responsibility – e.g., verdict decision in a
murder trial) then both high and low NCs should be
motivated to put forth cognitive effort. As Cacioppo et al. [15,
p. 244] stated “some events or decisions have such high
personal relevance and consequences that nearly everyone
can be expected to give considerable thought to them.” In
contrast, when group consensus is high (all jury members are
exposed to N-PTP), motivation to perform and engage in
effortful cognitive processing should be reduced (even when
the decision is deemed important), which is likely to result in
social loafing by low NCs. In such situations low NCs can
count on their high-NC counterparts to present supporting
evidence for their preferred side [9].
In summary, both NC and situational variables have been
found to affect individuals’ motivation and ability to engage

in effortful cognitive processing. Obviously, jurors’
motivation to process case-related information and
participate in jury deliberations can have an important
impact on both juror and jury decisions, as well as the jury
deliberation process. Our questions regarding whether PTP
and NC interact to affect verdicts and deliberation behavior
are important given that on actual juries there will be a
naturally occurring distribution of jurors who are high and
low in NC. These jurors, at least in high-profile cases, are
likely to have some exposure to PTP. Jurors who are most
active and successful at consensus building and who take on
leadership roles during deliberations will have the most
influence on the jury’s verdict. Thus, if high NCs have been
exposed to PTP this may be especially problematic and may
result in jury deliberations increasing juror bias (polarizing).
This being said, when compared to low NCs, high NCs have
been found to be less likely to vote guilty in cases that are
moderately strong, presumably due to their propensity to
critically examine all evidence and ability and willingness to
correct for bias.
1.4. Hypotheses
In consideration of theory and previous research we
formulated three hypotheses relating to how PTP exposure
and NC status would influence mock-jurors’ guilt
assessments and predeliberation consensus, and two
hypotheses regarding how PTP and NC would affect juror
deliberation behaviors.
Hypothesis 1. Jurors exposed to N-PTP will have higher
guilt assessments (higher guilt ratings and more likely to
render guilty verdicts) than jurors and juries who are not
exposed to PTP (non-exposed).
Hypothesis 2. The effect of PTP on juror verdicts and
guilt ratings was expected to be moderated by NC, which
would be demonstrated by a significant NC x PTP
interaction. Specifically, N-PTP jurors who were high in NC
should demonstrate less PTP bias (lower conviction rates and
mean guilt ratings) than their low NC counterparts. We did
not expect our non-exposed jurors to differ on verdicts as a
function of NC status.
Hypothesis 3. Given the ambiguity of the trial stimuli and
the biasing effect of N-PTP, we expected that the N-PTP
juries would demonstrate greater consensus/agreement in
their predeliberation verdicts than non-exposed juries.
Hypothesis 4. During deliberations, we expected that
jurors scoring high in NC would be rated as more assertive,
persuasive, knowledgeable, and confident; as well as having
more influence on verdicts, scoring higher on leadership,
providing more logical/valid arguments, and would spend a
greater amount of time talking than their low NC
counterparts.
Hypothesis 5. The main effect of NC on juror deliberation
behavior was expected to be qualified by a significant PTP x
NC interaction. Specifically, the significant differences in
juror deliberation behavior noted in hypothesis 4 are
expected only for jurors exposed to N-PTP. Non-exposed
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jurors, regardless of NC status, should put forth considerable
thought and effort due to the presence of situational factors
(e.g., personal responsibility associated with criminal trial
and low pre-deliberation consensus) that have been found to
reduce or eliminate observed difference between high and
low NCs. In contrast, if as expected pre-deliberation
consensus is high among N-PTP jurors then personal
responsibility will be reduced; resulting in reduced
motivation. Reduction in motivation in group situations has
been found to result in social loafing for low NCs, but not
high NCs [30].

2. Method
2.1. Participants
The participants consisted of 169 jury-eligible university
students (51 males and 118 females) who ranged in age from
18 to 51 (M = 20, SD = 4.60). Participants received extra
course credit for their participation. Of these participants,
100 were Caucasian, 34 were African American, 11 were
Asian, 23 were Hispanic, and 1 fell into the other category.
2.2. Stimuli
2.2.1. Trial
A videotaped murder trial (NJ v Bias) of a man accused of
murdering his wife was edited to run approximately 30
minutes. The defendant claimed that his wife accidentally
shot herself when he tried to prevent her from committing
suicide. The edited trial contained all of the elements of an
actual trial (i.e., opening and closing arguments of the
prosecution and defense, direct and cross-examinations of
prosecution and defense witnesses, and closing arguments of
prosecution and defense). Prior research using the same
stimulus trial [1, 32-34] indicated that the trial was perceived
as being realistic and believable and was ambiguous as to
guilt.
2.2.2. Pretrial Publicity
The N-PTP stimulus consisted of nine actual news stories
written about the NJ v Bias case that were modified for use in
this study. These news stories contained general case
information (e.g., victim information, when and where the
crime took place, and a description of the crime) and
negative information about the defendant that was not
presented in trial, which could have a biasing effect on
juror/jury decisions (see Appendix A for a sample of PTP
information).
The news articles for the non-exposed condition consisted
of nine actual news stories that were approximately the same
length (10 pages of text) as the N-PTP articles and were
taken from the same newspaper archive. These articles
contained information about a women accused of
embezzling child support funds.
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2.3. Measures
2.3.1. Verdicts and Guilt Rating
The participants were asked for their verdicts (not guilty,
hung, or guilty) and verdict confidence scores (1 = not at all
confident to 7 = completely confident). The hung option was
only available for the group verdict. To obtain the guilt
ratings, jurors’ confidence scores and verdicts were
combined resulting in a 14 point scale ranging from 1
(indicating completely confident in not guilty verdict) to 14
(completely confident in a guilty verdict). Unanimous juries
deliberated to consensus on both verdicts and verdict
confidence, producing a single verdict and confidence score,
from which a single guilt rating was calculated. If a jury
came to a hung verdict each juror member was asked to
provide his/her own verdict and confidence score. Guilt
ratings for hung juries consisted of the mean guilt rating of
its members.
2.3.2. Need for Cognition
Prior to reading the news articles, participants completed
the 18-item Need for Cognition scale [13]. The NC scale
consists of statements such as, “Thinking is not my idea of
fun” and “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must
solve.” The response scale for these items ranged from 1
(extremely uncharacteristic of you) to 5 (extremely
characteristic of you), with 3 indicating uncertain. Therefore,
participant scores could range from 18 to 90, with the
observed range being 37 to 83. Similar to Bornstein [8] and
Shestowsky and Horowitz [9], the distribution of NC scores
(N = 169) was bifurcated with those in the bottom half of the
distribution labeled low NCs (M = 52.71, SD = 5.97) and
those in the top half labeled high NCs (M = 68.31, SD = 4.79).
These dichotomous scores were used in all analyses. Jurors
were randomly assigned to juries and PTP conditions
resulting in four juries (2 N-PTP and 2 non-exposed) having
only one high or low NC juror, the remaining juries had at
least 2 high and 2 low NC jurors. The number of high and
low NCs jurors across the PTP conditions was approximately
equal. For N-PTP there were 46 (52%) high NCs and 42
(48%) low NCs. For the non-exposed there were 43 (53%)
high NCs and 38 (47%) low NCs. The mean proportion of
high and low NCs sitting on individual juries was similar
(Ms = .53 and .47, SDs = .16 and .16, respectively). Finally,
N-PTP and U-PTP conditions did not significantly differ on
mean NC scores (Ms = 61.53 and 60.53, SDs = 8.91 and 9.84,
respectively), F(1, 167) = 0.69, MSE = 87.72, p = .41.
2.4. Design
This experiment utilized a 2 (PTP: N-PTP vs.
non-exposed) x 2 (NC: low vs. high) between subjects design.
Juries consisted of 5 to 6 mock-jurors who deliberated and
made a group decision regarding guilt of the defendant. Of
the 29 juries, 15 were exposed to N-PTP (n = 88) and 14
were not exposed to PTP (n = 81). For the N-PTP exposed
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juries, 13 consisted of 6 jurors and 2 consisted of 5 jurors.
For the non-exposed juries, 11 consisted of 6 jurors and 3
consisted of 5 jurors.
2.5. Procedure
This experiment consisted of three phases, which are
explained below. Written informed consent was obtained at
the beginning of each phase of the experiment.
2.5.1. First Phase
During phase 1, participants completed a demographic
questionnaire and NC scale. They then read either the N-PTP
or unrelated news stories. Before being excused the
participants were instructed not to talk about anything they
had read during the study with each other.
2.5.2. Second Phase
Approximately one week after exposure to the articles,
participants viewed the videotaped murder trial. At the end
of the video trial the judge gave the jury the following
instructions: “If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did in fact cause the victim’s death,
or that the defendant acted purposely or knowingly, then you
must find the defendant not guilty of murder.” The
participants were then excused for the day and reminded not
to talk to each other or anyone else about the trial and to
return in two days for the third phase of the experiment.

2.6. Content Analysis
Our coding scheme is a modification of the one used by
Shestowsky and Horowitz in Study 1 [9, see their Table 3] to
measure juror behavior during mock-jury deliberations. Our
modification involved developing our own unique coding
manual that included the following information for each
behavior coded: synonyms/definitional words, antonyms,
examples of behaviors, and examples of statements (see
Appendix B).
During approximately three weeks of training, three
coders, who were naï
ve to our research hypotheses and
conditions, were taught to code the jury deliberation videos
using the coding scheme and manual. All coders then coded
the same practice tapes taken from a similar study. This
involved providing ratings of each juror (1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree) on all behaviors (see Table 3
for behavior coded). The codings of these trainees’ were
compared to the trainer’s coding and disagreements were
discussed during training meetings. Once reliability analyses
indicated overall inter-rater agreement of at least .75 for all 3
coders, each coder was assigned between 19 and 20
videotaped jury deliberations to code.
Interclass correlations (ICC) were calculated for each of
the coded behaviors; this is referred to as category by
category reliability [36]). Inter-rater agreement was
moderate to high for all coded behaviors (ICCs ranged
from .71 to .93, M = .88). Mean ratings for each coded
behavior were used in our ANOVAs.

2.5.3. Third Phase
Two days after viewing the trial the mock-juror
participants were given the following instructions: “During
the first phase of the study you may have read crime stories
related to the trial that you viewed during phase 2. Like
actual jurors you are not to use any of this prior information
when making decisions about the defendant’s guilt. For this
decision you must only use the evidence presented at trial.”
Each juror then provided an individual predeliberation
verdict and verdict confidence rating. After these verdict
forms were collected, jurors were told that they had 30
minutes to deliberate and decide on unanimous group verdict.
They were given a jury verdict form that included space for a
group verdict and confidence rating. The experimenter left
the room and returned five minutes prior to the end of the
deliberations. If the jury had not reached a unanimous
decision at that time they were instructed to try their best to
do so within the next 5 minutes. After deliberations, jurors
were asked individually to provide verdicts and confidence
ratings one final time. The 29 mock-jury deliberations were
recorded using a high-resolution digital video camera. These
videos were content analyzed using the procedures below1.

3. Results
3.1. Statistical Analyses
The alpha level for significance was set at .05.
Hypotheses involving predeliberation and jury verdicts
were tested with 2 (PTP: N-PTP or non-exposed) x 2 (NC:
high or low) Loglinear ANOVAs, which use the test
statistic chi-square rather than F-tests, while GLM
ANOVAs were used for their associated guilt ratings.
Effect sizes are reported as omega squared (2) for F-tests
and as Cramer’s V for chi-square tests associated with the
Loglinear ANOVAs.
The post-deliberation individual verdicts were analyzed
with logistic Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM; SAS Proc
Glimmix), along with procedures for estimating multilevel
models [37-39]. We found that the model including both
level-1 (juror-level) and level-2 (jury-level) variables fit
these data best. The specific model used is referred to as
“An Intercepts and Slopes-as-Outcomes Model” by
Raudenbush and Bryk [38, p. 80]. The single equation
representation of this model is presented be

1

A delay was initiated between the trial viewing and deliberations in an attempt
to increase ecological validity over that of previous jury deliberation studies
[e.g., 9 and 33]. Litras and Golmant’s [35] review of juror utilization in US
District Courts found that during 2002 the average length of criminal trials
ranged from 2.2 to 12.3 days, with an average length of 4.3 days. Consequently,
in actual trials there will be a delay between evidence presented early during

trial and jury deliberations. This delay may affect what evidence is discussed
and participation of individual jury members during deliberations.
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Table 1. Individual Verdict Frequencies and Percentages and Guilt Rating Means and Standard Deviation
PTP Condition
Guilt Measure

Nonexp

N-PTP

NC condition
L-NC

PTP x NC Condition
Nonexp x
L-NC

H-NC

Nonexp x
H-NC

N-PTP x
L-NC

N-PTP x
H-NC

Pre-deliberation Individual Verdicts and Guilt Rating
Guilty Verdict
Guilt Rating

42 (52%)

71 (81%)

55 (69%)

58 (65%)

18 (47%)

24 (56%)

37 (88%)

34 (74%)

7.93 (4.65)

11.20 (3.55)

9.86 (4.49)

9.43 (4.37)

7.55 (4.74)

8.26 (4.60)

11.95 (3.01)

10.52 (3.89)

Post-deliberation Individual Verdicts and Guilt Ratings
Guilty Verdict
Guilt Rating

26 (32%)

67 (76%)

44 (55%)

49 (55%)

9 (24%)

17 (40%)

35 (83%)

32 (70%)

6.68 (4.08)

10.80 (3.42)

8.91 (4.49)

8.74 (4.08)

5.87 (3.71)

7.40 (4.29)

11.67 (3.18)

10.00 (3.47)

Note. N-PTP = negative pretrial publicity, Noexp = no PTP, L-NC = low need for cognition, H-NC = high need for cognition. Row percentages for guilty verdicts
appear in parentheses. Guilt ratings ranged from 1 (not guilty and completely confident) to 14 (guilty and completely confident) and standard deviations appear in
parentheses next to their respective means.

Yij = 00 + 01Jury NCCenteredj + 02PTPj + 10(NCij - N j)
+ 11JuryNCCenteredj(NCij - N j)
+ 12PTPj(NCij - N j) + u0j + u1j(NCij - N j) + rij
In this model, PTP was entered as a fixed effect (dummy
coded: non-exposed = 0 and N-PTP = 1), individual juror
NC ratings (low = 1 and high = 2) as both fixed and random
effects, and jury membership and jury centered NC scores
(mean NC rating for each jury centered at the grand mean =
0) as a random effect. For ease of interpretation of these
analyses, verdicts were recoded so that not guilty = 1 and
guilty = 2.
The post-deliberation individual guilt ratings and juror
deliberation behaviors also have a hierarchical structure and
these data were analyzed using 2 (PTP: N-PTP or
non-exposed) x 2 (NC: high or low) Hierarchical ANOVAs
with jurors nested within juries. The nested error term was
used for all analyses, regardless of significance level (F =
MSeffect / MSjurors (juries)).
3.2. Hypotheses 1 and 2: Guilt Measures
A 2 x 2 Loglinear ANOVA (verdicts) and GLM ANOVA
(guilt ratings) revealed that prior to deliberations, N-PTP
jurors were significantly more likely than non-exposed jurors
to vote guilty and have higher guilt ratings (see the top panel
of Table 1), 2 (1, N = 169) = 15.74, V = .31, F(1, 165) =
27.79, MSE = 16.81, 2 = .18, ps < .01. Contrary to our
expectations, there was not a significant main effect of NC or
a significant PTP x NC interaction on pre-deliberation
verdicts or guilt ratings, 2s(1, N = 169) = 0.71 and 3.13,
Fs(1, 165) = 0.33 and 2.85, MSE = 16.81, ps > .08. One-way
ANOVAs (Loglinear and GLM) revealed that there was a
significant effect of PTP on jury verdicts and guilt ratings,
2(1, N = 29) = 8.39, V = .56, F(1, 27) = 11.27, MSE = 10.85,
2 = .26, ps < .01. Juries exposed to N-PTP were more likely
to vote guilty and have higher guilt ratings than non-exposed
juries (see Table 2)2.
2

The jury verdict and guilt rating analyses were also run without the hung
juries. In this reduced sample there were 11 non-exposed and 11 N-PTP exposed
juries. The outcome of these analyses was the same as that for all 29 juries, with

A fixed effects Logistic HLM, with jurors nested within
juries, was performed to assess the effect of PTP and NC on
post-deliberation individual verdicts (see second panel of
Table 1). The first model tested was the one-way ANOVA
model with random effects [38], and was used to explore
how much the juries varied in their individual
post-deliberation verdicts. This model is represented in the
following equation: Verdictij = 00 + u0j + rij. The effect of
jury was significant, 00 = 5.92, SE = 2.26, z = 2.62, p = .009.
The intraclass correlation for the effect of jury on verdict was
calculated using the following formula:
(5.92)/(5.92 + 3.29) = .64 [40], indicating that 64%
of the variance in juror verdicts is attributable to jury
characteristics.
Table 2. Frequency Counts and Percentages for Group Verdicts and Means
and Standard Deviation for Guilt Ratings
Verdicts
Condition

Not Guilty

Hung

Guilty

Guilt Ratings

N-PTP

2 (13%)

4 (27%)

9 (60%)

10.47 (3.34)

Nonexp

9 (64%)

3 (21%)

2 (14%)

6.36 (3.25)

Total

11 (38%)

7 (24%)

11 (38%)

N/A

Note. N-PTP = negative pretrial publicity, Nonexp = no PTP. Row percentages
for verdicts appear in parentheses next to their respective frequencies. Guilt
ratings ranged from 1 (not guilty and completely confident) to 14 (guilty and
completely confident) and standard deviation appear in parentheses next to their
respective means.

Given the results above, logistic HLM analyses were
deemed appropriate for post-deliberation individual verdicts.
We used a model that included both juror-level and
jury-level predictors and is consistent with Raudenbush and
Bryk’s [38] intercepts and slopes-as-outcomes model (see
the statistical analysis section above). The intercept for
verdicts was not significant, 00 = 1.04, SE = 1.17, t(27) =
0.89, p = .38, 95% CI [-1.35, 3.43]. The fixed effects of
PTP and the PTP x deliberation interaction were significant,

juries exposed to N-PTP being more likely to vote guilty (82% vs. 19%) and
have higher guilt ratings (Ms = 11.00 vs. 6.00, SDs 3.77 and 3.55, respectively)
than non-exposed juries, 2(1, N = 22) = 8.91, V = .64, F(1, 20) = 11.27, MSE =
10.86, 2 = .30, ps < .01.
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01 = -3.24 and 12 = 2.69, SEs = 1.12 and 1.10, ts(27) = -2.90

54.32, 2 = .21, p = .001. As can be seen in the bottom panel
of Table 1, jurors exposed to N-PTP had higher guilt ratings
than those not exposed to PTP. While the association
between NC and guilt ratings, as a function of PTP status,
appears similar for guilt ratings as for verdicts, the PTP x NC
interaction was not significant, F(1, 29) = 1.97, MSE = 54.32,
p = .17.
The above results suggest that N-PTP jurors high in NC
were able to partially correct for PTP bias in their verdicts,
but this same correction was not observed for guilt ratings.
The relationship between NC and verdicts was negative for
N-PTP jurors and positive for non-exposed jurors. These
post-deliberation differences may be the result of differences
in NCs’ influence on juror deliberation behavior as a
function of PTP exposure, and is explored below.

and 2.42, ps =.007 and .02, 95% CIs [-5.53, -0.95] and [0.53,
4.86]. The significant interaction indicates that the intercepts
and the slopes for verdicts, as a function of NC, are different
for N-PTP and non-exposed jurors. When jurors were
exposed to N-PTP, high NCs were less likely to vote guilty
than low NCs (see bottom panel of Table 1), suggesting that
NC had a corrective function on juror bias. In contrast, for
non-exposed jurors high NCs were almost twice as likely to
vote guilty as low NCs. Once again the intraclass correlation
was calculated using the formula,
3.29) =
(6.26)/(6.26 + 3.29) = .67.
In order to examine the effect of PTP and NC on
post-deliberation individual guilt ratings, a 2 (PTP) x 2 (NC)
Hierarchical ANOVA was conducted, with jurors nested
within juries. Only PTP had a significant effect on
post-deliberation guilt ratings, F(1, 29) = 13.15, MSE =

Table 3. Jury Deliberation Behaviors: Main Effects of PTP Exposure and Need for Cognition
NC

PTP

Non-exposed

N-PTP

0.74

4.94 (1.67)

4.72 (1.84)

2.91 (1.87)

2.77

3.01 (1.82)

3.49 (2.05)

5.27 (0.93)

5.46 (1.02)

0.01

5.38 (0.87)

5.36 (1.08)

4.66 (1.54)

5.01 (1.51)

0.17

4.91 (1.38)

4.78 (1.66)

4.41* (.02)

3.66 (1.84)

4.26(2.04)

0.23

3.91 (1.90)

4.04 (2.03)

Persuade Attempts

2.08

4.12 (1.91)

4.67 (2.03)

0.06

4.36 (1.87)

4.45 (2.09)

Influence Verdict

1.00

3.70 (1.89)

4.01 (1.92)

0.76

4.01 (1.74)

3.73 (2.05)

Talk Time

28.69** (.05)

0.14 (.10)

0.19 (.12)

0.93

0.16 (.11)

0.17 (.12)

Coded Behavior

F (1, 29)

Low NC

High NC

F (1, 29)

Assertive

4.33* (.02)

4.54 (1.81)

5.07 (1.67)

Passive

6.79* (.03)

3.66 (1.97)

Logical Arguments

1.21

Strong Arguments

1.46

Leadership

Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. ~ p < .09. All F-tests and contrast test involved Hierarchical ANOVAs and used the following MS ratio: F = MSeffect /
MSjurors(juries). The effect sizes (omega squared) are presented in parentheses by their respective F-values when p < .09. Mean ratings are based on the
following scale: 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses next to their respective means.
Talk time = the mean proportion of deliberation time that jurors spent talking about case-related information.
Table 4. Jury Deliberation Behaviors as a Function of PTP Exposure x Need for Cognition
PTP x NC

N-PTP

N-PTP

NC contrast

Non-exposed

Non-exposed

NC contrast

Coded Behavior

F (1, 29)

Low NC

High NC

F (1, 29)

Low NC

High NC

F (1, 29)

Assertive

5.91* (.03)

4.13 (1.94)

5.25 (1.59)

10.66** (.05)

5.00 (1.55)

4.88 (1.79)

0.69

Passive

6.15* (.03)

4.23 (2.02)

2.82 (1.84)

12.73** (.06)

3.01 (1.72)

3.01 (1.92)

0.82

Logical Arguments

3.38~ (.02)

5.11 (1.17)

5.58 (0.94)

3.91~ (.02)

5.45 (0.52)

5.31 (1.09)

0.46

Strong Arguments

2.12

4.39 (1.74)

5.14 (1.53)

4.22* (.03)

4.95 (1.26)

4.87 (1.50)

0.73

Leadership

6.73** (.03)

3.35 (1.97)

4.67(1.90)

10.98**(.05)

4.00 (1.64)

3.83 (2.11)

0.13

Persuade Attempts

0.36

4.05 (2.14)

4.83 (2.00)

1.93

4.20 (1.63)

4.51 (2.07)

0.15

Influence Verdict

4.29* (.02)

3.27 (2.12)

4.15 (1.91)

4.71* (.02)

4.17 (1.49)

3.86 (1.94)

0.11

Talk Time

22.39** (.04)

0.12 (.09)

0.22 (.13)

46.67* (.08)

0.16 (.11)

0.16 (.10)

0.01

Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. ~ p < .09. All F-tests and contrast test involved Hierarchical ANOVAs and used the following MS ratio: F = MSeffect /
MSjurors(juries). The effect sizes (omega squared) are presented in parentheses by their respective F-values when p < .09. Mean ratings are based on the
following scale: 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses next to their respective means.
Talk time = the mean proportion of deliberation time that jurors spent talking about case-related information.
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3.3. Hypothesis 3: Agreement in Predeliberation Verdicts
We defined agreement in predeliberation verdicts as the
percentage of jurors on each jury whose predeliberation
verdicts were the same (e.g., if 4 out of 6 jurors voted guilty
the agreement would be 67%). As expected, a one-way
ANOVA revealed that non-exposed juries demonstrated a
lower level of agreement prior to deliberations (M = 65%,
SD = 11.44%) than N-PTP exposed juries (M = 82%, SD =
18.76%), F (1, 27) = 8.12, MSE = 245.58, p < .01, 2 = .20.
This difference in jury consensus was expected to be an
important situational variable affecting juror motivation and
hence influencing the NC processing links. This was
expected to lead to different juror behavioral outcomes for
high and low NC jurors in the N-PTP and non-exposed
conditions, which are explored in hypotheses 4 and 5 below.
3.4. Hypotheses 4 and 5: Juror Deliberation Behaviors
In order to examine the effect of PTP and NC on juror
deliberation behavior, 2 (PTP) x 2 (NC) Hierarchical
ANOVAs were conducted, with jurors nested within juries.
The means, standard deviations, and F-values for these
analyses are presented in Tables 3 (main effects) and 4
(interactions). As can be seen in Table 3, NC had a
significant main effect on four of the juror deliberation
behaviors (assertive, passive, leadership, and proportion of
deliberation time spent talking), while PTP did not have a
significant main effect on any of the behaviors examined.
The PTP x NC interaction effects and their associated
contrast tests are presented in Table 4, which shows a
significant interaction effect on assertiveness, passiveness,
leadership, influence on verdict, and talk time, while logical
arguments approached significance (p = .08). When exposed
to N-PTP, jurors high in NC were rated significantly higher
than low NC jurors on assertiveness, logical arguments,
strong arguments, leadership, influence on verdicts, and
significantly lower on passiveness (see Table 4). In addition,
N-PTP jurors high in NC spent a greater proportion of the
deliberation time talking than their low NC counterparts
(see Table 4). Taken together these results suggests that
N-PTP jurors high in NC were more active and had more
influence on the jury deliberation process and its outcome
(jury verdict) than N-PTP jurors low in NC. In contrast, as
expected high- and low-NC jurors in the non-exposed
condition did not significantly differ on any of the
deliberation behaviors coded (see Table 4).

4. Discussion
The present study explored intrapersonal (juror decisions)
and interpersonal (deliberation behavior) aspects of NC on
decisions and behavior. We found that NC did not have a
main effect on juror decisions. However, NC was found to
interact with case a related variable (PTP) to influence both
decisions and behaviors. Specifically, the effect of NC on
juror verdicts and deliberation behavior depended on
whether jurors were exposed to N-PTP.
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In regards to interpersonal aspects of NC and its effects on
deliberation behavior, NC status only mattered for jurors
exposed to N-PTP, with high NCs talking more and being
rated higher on assertiveness, logical arguments, strong
arguments, leadership, influence on verdicts, and lower on
passiveness. When jurors were not exposed to PTP, NC
status did not significantly influence any of the juror
deliberation behaviors coded.
Why should PTP exposure influence low NCs’
participation in jury deliberations? Research exploring
interpersonal aspects of NC demonstrates that high and low
NCs behave differently in interpersonal settings, which is
due to low NCs’ propensity for social loafing [30]. Research
and theory also suggests that differences in cognitive effort
between high and low NCs can be reduced, or eliminated, in
situations that increase individual motivation to perform
(e.g., personal relevance or responsibility is increased; 17, 15,
41). Shestowsky and Horowitz [9] provide an example of
how situational differences can influence behavior of low
NCs in interpersonal settings. Specifically, they found that
behavioral differences in high- and low-NCs observed in
Study 1, were less pronounced (e.g., speaking time and
argument recall), or opposite of what was expected (e.g.,
low NCs were more likely to change their positions when
exposed to strong arguments), when in Study 2, individual
accountability responsibility were increased. They
accomplished this in Study 2 by requiring individuals to
discuss their impressions of the case before discussing the
evidence. This is an interesting finding, and applicable to
the present study. For example, when there is low
predeliberation consensus (non-exposed juries) all jurors
may feel a heightened sense of responsibility to discuss
their impressions of the case, and feel more accountable for
the jury verdict. However, when predeliberation consensus
is high (N-PTP juries), presenting one’s impressions of the
case is not necessary, given that the majority shares your
views. Therefore, low NCs may feel free to socially loaf.
Importantly, Henningsen and Henningsen (2004) found that
high NCs can have a negative influence on group
productivity, due to their tendency to encourage discussion
of information that is already known to all members of the
group. For juries with high predeliberation consensus, such
behavior could increase social loafing in low NCs by
signaling that new information is not valued or needed to
reach group consensus. In summary, it appears that low-NC
jurors do have the ability to participate actively in jury
deliberations and make valuable contributions to them, but if
not motivated to do so, they will socially loaf.
The finding that exposure to PTP led to less motivation
perform in low-NCs may seem counterintuitive to some,
who might feel that PTP exposure should lead to increased
interest in a case and hence motivation to perform. This was
thought to be unlikely due to the following factors: (1) their
minds were already made up about the case during PTP
exposure phase, (2) their knowledge that the verdict
decision would be a group decision, (3) low-NCs tendency
for social loafing, and (4) early into deliberations they would
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realize that there was a high level of verdict consensus.
Therefore, there would not be significant situational forces to
increase low NCs motivation to perform. Of course, as
Shestowsky and Horowitz (2004) suggested, situational
factors that increase the accountability and personal
responsibility of the low NC juror (e.g., judicial instructions
focusing on the importance of individual contributions)
could reduce or eliminate this observed social loafing.
Now we turn to the intrapersonal aspects of NC and its
influence on juror decisions. Consistent with past research,
PTP exposure had a main effect on juror and jury verdicts
and guilt ratings. Jurors and juries exposed to N-PTP were
more likely to vote guilty and provide higher guilt ratings
than non-exposed jurors/juries. Also consistent with
previous research, we found that while NC did not have a
main effect on verdicts or guilt ratings, it did interact with an
important case-related variable (PTP) to influence verdicts [8,
10-12]. Specifically, after deliberations N-PTP jurors high in
NC were less likely to vote guilty than their low-NC
counterparts. The opposite relationship was found for
non-exposed jurors. These results are particularly interesting
because they suggest that high-NC jurors exposed to PTP
were motivated and able to at least partially correct for PTP
bias, but their low-NC counterparts were not. These findings
also suggests that if the courts can motivate jurors to be more
cognitively active during trial presentation and jury
deliberations this could reduce the impact of PTP on their
decisions.
As mentioned above, high-NC jurors exposed to N-PTP
were rated as more active and influential during deliberations
than similarly exposed low-NC jurors. These results taken
together with the verdict results suggest that high NCs
tendency for greater bias correction and influence on jury
deliberations could result in less biased jury verdicts.
Although this is possible, research by Sommers and Kassin
[12] suggests that the bias correction of high-NC jurors may
be selective. Specifically, information deemed reliable and
necessary to reach a “just” verdict will be used, whereas
unreliable information will not be used. Sommers and Kassin
define a “just” verdict as one that is accurate in regards to
whether the defendant committed the crime and deserves
punishment. According to Sommers and Kassin [12] jurors
are largely motivated to come to a “just” verdict, “regardless
of whether this decision conforms to the rules or evidence”
(p. 1369). This may partially account for why we observed
only a modest reduction in PTP bias on verdicts for high-NC
jurors. That is, jurors may have viewed some of the
information contained in the N-PTP as reliable, and therefore
knowingly used it when rendering verdicts, even though they
were admonished not to.
4.1. Limitations and Future Directions
The current study, like all jury simulation research, is
limited in that we used mock-jurors whose decisions would
not impact an actual defendant and trial stimuli that was

considerably shorter than an actual trial (30 minutes), as
were our jury deliberations (30 minutes). In addition, our
mock-jurors consisted of college students and while some
research suggests that the differences among college students
and “community members” are trivial [42, 43], other
researchers suggest that due to cognitive and attitudinal
differences college student samples may not generalize well
to jury eligible samples [44, 45]. These cognitive differences
are relevant here given the focus on NC and the fact that for
this student subsample of jury eligible adults the range of NC
scores may be more restricted (although the range was quite
large, 37 to 83) and the scores are likely higher than the
general public [8], thus providing a conservative test of our
NC hypotheses. Finally, we only looked at exposure to one
type of PTP (negative) and therefore we do not know
whether our results would generalize to positive
(pro-defendant) PTP exposure. Depending on the amount
and types (e.g., negative, positive, or mixture) of PTP
surrounding a case, individual jurors may be exposed to
different amounts or types of PTP, with some not being
exposed to any PTP. This differential exposure obviously
has the potential to affect the level of consensus at the
beginning of the trial, and therefore could affect motivation
to participate in deliberations.

5. Conclusions
Even with these limitations, the current research has
important implications for the legal system and the
understanding of the jury deliberation process. First, this
research suggests that NC may interact with case related
variables and under certain conditions (e.g., N-PTP exposure)
to impact juror decisions and behavior. Second, it appears
that high-NCs are capable of reducing the biasing effect of
PTP on verdicts, which is an especially promising finding
that deserves more research. Third, given that high-NCs
jurors exposed to N-PTP spoke for almost twice as long
during deliberations and were viewed as more assertive,
influential, and providing stronger arguments than their
low-NC counterparts, it is likely that they will have more
influence on verdict decisions. Therefore, instead of being
a collaborative decision among a group of people, the verdict
decision could be the product of one or two high-NC jurors.
Importantly, research and theory suggests unequal
participation of high- and low-NC jurors may be reduced or
eliminated if personal responsibility or perceived decision
importance is increased [see 15 for review]. These are both
plausible explanations for why our non-exposed jurors’
deliberation behavior did not vary as a function of NC status
and deserve further exploration. Increasing the perception of
decision importance and individual responsibility could be
accomplished through judicial instructions. Additional
research is obviously needed to more fully understand NCs
influence on both juror and jury behavior and decisions.
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Appendix A: Sample of Items from the
News Stories
Negative PTP Facts

Unrelated News Stories

1. Dan remarried after Lise’s
death.

1. Renee Godshalk arrested for
embezzling child support
payments.

2. Dan drinking alcohol the
night of Lise’s death.

2. Exactly how much is missing is
still undetermined, but it could
be as much as $84,000.

3. Dan said Lise wanted
career over family.

3. Domestic relations wasn’t
balancing its checkbook on
time; theft unnoticed.

4. Dan never showed
remorse.

4. Checks were held for weeks,
months, or years before
depositing.

5. The couple often argued.

5. Godshalk took another $54,493
under another.

6. Dan violent toward women
in past

6. Mothers were complaining
they weren’t receiving checks;
fathers had receipts.

7. Dan didn’t administer CPR
to Lise

7. A computer flaw also resulted
in some people getting
''duplicate checks.

The juror participated assertively during the deliberation
process.
Synonyms/Definitional Words
■ Bold, forward, forceful, self-assured about speaking up,
seems confident that his or her opinion deserves to be
heard at least as much as anyone else’s opinion,
emphatic, firm, insistent.
■ This construct borders on aggressiveness. However, if
the person appears angry and uses threatening or
demeaning language… then that would be aggressive
and no longer what we are trying to measure
(assertiveness).
Antonyms
■ Quiet, shy, unconfident about speaking one’s opinion,
inhibited, hesitant to voice one’s opinion, timid.
Examples of Behaviors that indicate assertiveness
■ Repeatedly stating one’s point of view.
■ Butting in to express one’s view.
■ Butting in to finish speaking if someone else has butted
in.
■ Talking louder to finish speaking if someone is trying
to butt in.
■ Repeatedly taking the opportunity to speak as soon as
someone else pauses (even when that person is not
finished speaking) or as soon as someone finishes
speaking (that is, making repeated attempts to insure
that one’s opinion is expressed and heard by others).

Note. For NJ v. Bias Trial the defendant is Dan and the victim is Lise.

Appendix B: Juror Behaviors Coded
and Coding Manual Example
1. Assertive: The juror participated assertively during
the deliberation process.
2. Passive: The juror participated passively during the
deliberation process.
3. Logical/Valid Arguments: The juror presented logical
(valid) arguments in favor of his/her opinions.
4. Strong Arguments: The juror presented strong
arguments in favor of his/her opinions.
5. Leadership: The juror seemed to be a leader during
the deliberations.
6. Persuasive Attempts: The juror tried to persuade
others during the deliberation process.
7. Influence: This juror seemed to influence the other
jurors with his or her arguments.
8. Time Talking: The amount of time each juror spent
talking was coded/recorded in msec. The coding of
juror talk time differed from that of the rest of the
juror behavioral variables. Instead of using a scale to
rate how talkative each jurors was, time talking was
recorded using The Observer Video-Pro (Version 5.0;
Noldus Information Technology, 2003). Then each
jurors talk time was divided by the deliberation time
resulting in the proportion of deliberation time each
juror spent talking.
The coding manual consisted of definition of each coded
variable along with synonyms/ definitional words, antonyms,
and examples of behavior indicative of the construct. The
coding manual information for Assertiveness is presented
below:
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